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NOTES AND COMMENTS
CONSENT TO ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE BY A
PARTY TO A CONVERSATION:
A DIFFERENT APPROACH
Donald R. Bradford
Under the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968,
a law enforcement officer is allowed to intercept wire or oral communi-
cation where such officer is a party to the conversation or where one
of the parties to the conversation has given prior consent to such inter-
ception.1- Interception, whether by wiretapping, recording from an ex-
tension telephone, or by any other means where done with consent of
one of the parties is not subject to prior judicial approval, i.e., no war-
rant is required for such surveillance and interception.
That the foregoing provision of the Act is unconstitutional is the
subject of this comment in which three fundamental arguments are pre-
sented: (1) When a conversation is intercepted and recorded, much
more than the substance of -the conversation is taken. Identity of the
speaker, personality traits, emotional stress, and truthfulness of the
words spoken are just a few of the elements of the recorded voice which
may now be analyzed by modem electronic instruments. The "sei-
zure" of these elements of voice is therefore a violation of the
speaker's expected area of privacy. (2) The right to privacy and the
free flow of different ideas is fundamentally necessary to a democratic
society. Allowing electronic surveillance of speech without a warrant
is a serious erosion of the very foundation of our social structure. (3)
1. "it shall not be unlawful under this chapter for a person acting under color of
law to intercept a wire or oral communication, where such person is a party to the com-
munication or one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to such
interception." 18 U.S.C. § 2511(c) (1970).
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Since U.S. v. Katz2 a person's reasonable expectation regarding zones
of privacy is the test for determining the extent of fourth amendment
search and seizure protection. The idea that a third party may consent
to the violation of these protections is foreign to the concept of indi-
vidual constitutional rights guaranteed by the fourth amendment.
I. TECHNICAL ELEMENTS OF RECORDED SPEECH
A person speaks for the purpose of communicating an idea, but
he may in fact communicate much more than the spoken word if only
the listener has the proper electronic means to interpret the speech.
Upon proper analysis speech may be made to reveal the identity of the
speaker, his personality traits, and his emotional state, as well as his
veracity.
The earliest and most notable research in the area of identification
by voice analysis was conducted by L.G. Kersta at Bell Laboratories
and later at Voiceprint Laboratory, Inc. in the late 1950's and early
1960's.3 The technique of identifying a person by his voice involves
recording the voice and playing it back through a series of electronic
instruments which then produce a graphic display of the words spoken.
These voicegraphs, usually inscribed on paper, are said to be unique
for each individual just as fingerprints are unique. Voicegraphs have
been used for years by police investigators and recently have found
acceptance by courts as evidence of identification.4
Since Kersta's original work in the identification field, research re-
lating to voice analysis has spread to many areas and has lead to several
interesting applications. By electronically analyzing speech, research-
ers have been able to classify a speaker's emotional state as that of
sorrow, anger, or fear.5 Also, personality traits have been observed to
be inherent in all speech and can be used to predict a person's
susceptibility to heart attacks. 6 This research done at Mt. Zion Hospital
and Medical Center in San Francisco has resulted in the prediction of
potential heart attack patients in a test group with 75 to 84% accuracy.
With the ability to establish personality and other psychological
traits by voice analysis, it was inevitable that researchers in the lie de-
2. United States v. Katz, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
3. Steinhaver, Voiceprints, SAT. REVIEW, Sept. 9, 1969, at 56.
4. Vaughn, New Trends In Admissibility of Polygraph Tests and Spectrogram
Voiceprint Identification Evidence, 2 MEMPHiS STATE U.L. Rv. 282 (1973).
5. Williams and Stevens, Emotions and Speech; Some Acoustical Correlates, 52
AcoUSTIcAL Soc. AM. J. 1238, 1249 (1969).
6. Heart Doctors Heed Telltale Voice, BusiNEss WEEK, May 24, 1969, at 130.
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tection field would become very interested. In fact a device has been
produced which is capable of detecting false statements by means of
voice analysis. The electronic device called a Psychological Stress
Evaluator (PSE) has been tested for about two years with amazing re-
sults. The PSE was used to pick the truthful participant in the televi-
sion program "To Tell The Truth" and was found to be accurate in
94.7% of the trials. 7
Of course most of the work being done in the area of speech
analysis must still be considered experimental, although without a doubt
it can be said that recorded speech contains a wealth of information
about the speakcr which should be considered private. Few people
would question the premise that it would be a violation of fourth and
fifth amendments rights (and possibly others) to force a person without
justifiable reason to be subjected to a lie detector test, a personality
test, or a test which evaluates emotions,' but nevertheless section 2511
of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 allows just
such a violation.
A police officer, by recording a private telephone conversation or
by recording a conversation between a suspect and an undercover agent
with a hidden tap- recorder, is able to gain access to such private in-
formation without the speaker's knowing or consenting to such revela-
tion. Under the Crime Control Act this may be accomplished with a
warrant without the knowledge of either party or such surveillance may
be accomplished without a warrant provided one of the parties has con-
sented to the interception. It is the purpose of this comment to discuss
only the latter.
The cases which have considered the validity of consent to
electronic surveillance have compared interception and recording of in-
formation to the disclosure of the conversation by one of the parties.
The argument states -that since one may divulge a conversation by testi-
fying to its contents, then he should also be allowed either to record
the conversation or to consent to its recording by a third party. Since
anyone entering into a conversation assumes the risk that the other
party may subsequently reveal his secrets he must also assume the risk
that the conversation may be recorded.9
7. Big Brother Is Listening: Psychological Stress Evaluator, TIME, 99:91-2 Je. 19,
1972.
8. Annot., 23 A.L.R.2d 1306 (1952); Annot., 25 A.L.R.2d 1407 (1952).
9. White v. United States, 401 U.S. 745 (1971); Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S.
323 (1966); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966); Lopez v. United States, 373
U.S. 427 (1963). See also Greenwalt, The Consent Problem in Wiretapping and Eaves-
[Vol. 10:386
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The flaw in this argument is in its assumption that disclosure of
a conversation by testimony and disclosure through a tape recording are
essentially identical. As has been observed above, this is certainly not
a valid assumption in light of the numerous characteristics of speech
which are undetected by the unaided ear.
An analogy which illustrates this difference can be seen by noting
the difference between describing a person and photographing the
same person. While both methods are descriptive, a photograph
certainly contains much more than a verbal description, and courts have
had little trouble making the distinction.'0 Although one assumes the
risk that a guest may verbally divulge his appearance he does not
assume the risk that the same guest may photograph him without his
consent.
This "assumption of risk" argument for allowing third party con-
sent to electronic surveillance is mentioned at this point for introductory
purposes only. A more detailed analysis of the cases accepting this
argument will be presented later in the comment. At this juncture it
is important to conclude that, based on the authority presented, there
is a significant amount of private information which may be seized by
recording the human voice. The full impact of this phenomenon on
society and the legal ramifications of it are developed in the remainder
of this comment.
II. T E SOCIAL IMPACT
Electronic surveillance is not a very recent development in this
country nor has it been limited to the private sector.
On his retirement from federal service in 1949, William
Mellin, chief wiretapper for the Treasury, announced in the
Saturday Evening Post that he had installed more than
10,000 wiretaps for the Treasury between 1934 and 1948.
A stream of disclosures during the 1940's and early 1950's
revealed that electronic eavesdropping was used by other
federal agencies, such as the Post Office, and some congres-
sional committees, and that intra-agency monitoring was
employed by many federal executive departments."
The total effect of this activity on society is difficult to measure,
but without a doubt a portion of our privacy is lost to electronic
dropping: Surreptitious Monitoring With The Consent of a Participant in a Conversa-
tion, 68 CoLUM. L. REv. 189 (1968).
10. See Annot., 14 A.L.R.2d 750 (1950) for a collection of these types of cases.
11. A. WESTIN, PRIVAcY AND FREEDOM 173 (1967).
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surveillance. Psychologists tell us that a certain amount of privacy is
required for good mental health and happiness in today's world.
Robert Merton explained this idea as follows:
What is sometimes called 'the need for privacy'-that is, in-
sulation of actions and thought from surveillance by others-
is the individual counterpart to the functional requirement of
social structure -that some measure of exemption from full
observability be provided for. Otherwise the pressure to live
up to the details of all (and often conflicting) social norms
would become literally unbearable; in a complex society,
schizophrenic behavior would become the rule rather than
the formidable exception it already is. 'Privacy' is not
merely a personal predilection; it is an important functional
requirement for the effective operation of social structure.
Social systems must provide for some appropriate measure,
as they would say in France, of quant-a soi-a portion of the
self which is kept apart, immune from social surveillance. 12
Coupled with, and closely related -to the need for privacy is the
need for a free flow of ideas in a democratic society. When people
become so restrained by the fear of eavesdropping that they become
overly cautious about what they say and to whom they say it, then the
spread of new ideas and free thought becomes seriously hampered. As
Justice Douglas put it in his dissent in United States v. White' (dis-
cussed fully later):
[M]ust everyone live in fear that every word he speaks may
be transmitted or recorded and later repeated to the entire
world? I can imagine nothing that has a more chilling effect
on people speaking -their minds and expressing their views
on important matters. The advocates of that regime should
spend some time in totalitarian countries and learn firsthand
the kind of regime they are creating here.' 4
The opportunity to speak "off the record" is essential to most
meaningful negotiations and other verbal exchanges among organiza-
tions and individuals. The kind of candor required for unrestrained
negotiations is impossible if the parties are in constant fear of being
recorded.
The New York Times reported a typical example of this need
when a series of community fact-finding conferences on local problems
in New York were taking place. The first open meetings of the con-
12. R. MERTON, SOCIAL THEORY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE 343 (1957). See also Tal-
ley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960); Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475 (1968).
13. 401 U.S. 745 (1971).
14. 401 U.S. at 764-65 (footnotes omitted).
[Vol. 10:386
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ference were marked by a lack of candor supposedly caused by -the
reluctance of the group to discuss racial problems in public. When the
meetings were closed, civic, labor and civil rights leaders spoke frankly
for the first time."5
When considered in this light, the argument that one must assume
the risk of being recorded whenever he speaks to another is untenable.
To equate the disclosure of a conversation by a friend in his own words
to the disclosure of the actual speech by a tape recording is to ignore
a fundamental attitude that we all possess. It is to ignore the feeling
that anyone has when he realizes that he is speaking to a large audi-
ence.
Not only is electronic eavesdropping a potential threat to our social
and political structure, it is also a violation of basic constitutional rights
when it is not conducted under proper authority. An analysis of Katz
and a consideration of the law of consent will show that valid consent
may properly be given by both parites to a conversation, but one party
may not waive the other's constitutional rights.
III. THE LEGAL ARGUMENT
Before turning to a full discussion of the recent law relating to
electronic eavesdropping, a brief history of the case law in this area
is in order.
Perhaps the first important United States Supreme Court case in-
volving electronic eavesdropping was Olmstead v. United States,-'0
which held that messages transmitted over telephone wires are not sub-
ject to constitutional protection against search and seizure. The Court
observed that a physical trespass must be involved before fourth
amendment protection may be invoked.
The Supreme Court relied on this old "trespass doctrine" in On
Lee v. United States, 7 where a friend of the defendant visited him
while secreting a hidden transmitter which allowed police officers to
overhear incriminating statements made by the defendant. Even
though the friend did not testify, the officers were allowed to testify
as to the statements transmitted to them by the hidden transmitter.
In Lopez v. United States' an IRS agent used a hidden tape re-
corder on his person to record an attempted bribe made to him by the
15. New York Times, Dec. 12, 1964.
16. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
17. 343 U.S. 747 (1952).
18. 373 U.S. 427 (1963).
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defendant. The Court held that no eavesdropping had taken place and
that the defendant had "misplaced his confidence" and had assumed
the risk that the agent would disclose the conversation or record it.
The "assumption of risk" argument was used by the Court in Hoffa
v. United States"9 to allow the admission of evidence obtained by an
informer with a concealed tape recorder on his person. The informer
was a trusted friend of Hoffa but was working for the police officers
investigating Hoffa. The Court rationalized that since Hoffa as-
sumed -the risk that his confidant would disclose various conversations
to the police then he also assumed the risk that the conversations would
be recorded.
One of the first departures from this rationale occurred in Osborn
v. United States,20 where an informer was used in much the same cir-
cumstances as in Hoffa except that a warrant was obtained which
allowed the recording. Instead of relying on Lopez and related cases,
the Supreme Court chose to rest its decision on the fact that the police
officers had obtained a warrant based on probable cause to believe that
the incriminating statements would be made to the undercover agent.
Approximately one year after the Osborn case was decided, the
Supreme Court reversed its previous stand on the requirement for a
trespass by specifically overruling Olmstead in Katz v. United States,2'
in which the Court described the area of protection under the fourth
amendment as being that area which a person reasonably regards as
private. It must be reasonable as a matter of law for anyone to consider
the area in question to be private. After Katz there is no requirement
that a physical trespass be made since in Katz a microphone was placed
outside a phone booth for purposes of eavesdropping on the defendant's
conversation within the phone booth. Because the defendant was held
to have had a reasonable expectation of privacy, the evidence so
obtained was suppressed.
After Katz there was still some doubt as to the status of the mis-
placed confidence rule of Lopez and Hoffa. The question remained
whether a party to the conversation (e.g., an undercover agent) could
record or consent to the recording of the defendant's statements. In
White v. United States2" the question was partially answered. The
facts in White were similar to -those in On Lee in that the defendant's
19. 385 U.S. 293 (1966).
20. 385 U.S. 323 (1966).
21. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
22. 401 U.S. 745 (1971).
[Vol. 10:386
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conversation with an informer was transmitted by electronic means to
police officers. In both cases the informer carried concealed electronic
transmitting equipment.
The Court in White, at the request of the Assistant Attorney
General, considered two issues in the case. The majority (5-4) agreed
that Katz did not apply to White since the case of Desist v. United
States 3 had ruled that -the Katz decision was not retroactive. However,
only four of the Justices (Justices White, Stewart, Blackmun, and Chief
Justice Burger) agreed that the facts of White, viewed under the
rationale of Katz and Hoffa, did not present a fourth amendment viola-
tion and therefore On Lee was still good law. Justice Black concurred
in the result but based his decision on his dissent in Katz which argued
that the fourth amendment did not apply to conversations. Justice
Brennan based his opinion on Desist and spzcifically disagreed with the
view that Katz did not apply to this case. Justices Harlan, Douglas,
and Marshall dissented individually to both arguments which left the
Court divided 4-4 on the issue of consensual eavesdropping.
Running through the Supreme Court's opinions in On Lee, Hoffa,
White, and related cases, is the argument that where one party to a
conversation consents to its surveillance by carrying a recorder, carrying
a transmitter, permitting police officers to listen on an extension phone,
or by some other means permitting the eavesdropping of the conversa-
tion, there has been no violation of the non-consenting party's fourth
amendment rights. This is true, goes the argument, because a person
who assumes the risk that his conversation will be verbally disclosed
to others must also assume the risk that the conversation might be re-
corded or transmitted to others. The fourth amendment does not pro-
tect a person from his misplaced confidence in those with whom he
communicates.
It is certainly true (assuming that the use of undercover agents
is lawful)24 that an undercover agent is free to testify as to conversa-
tions had with others. The above argument, however, makes no dis-
tinction between disclosing the contents of a conversation by testimony
and disclosing an electronic recording of the same conversation. As
discussed above, recorded speech contains much more than the com-
municated language. By proper analysis recorded speech may reveal
identity, emotional state, certain personality traits, as well as the
23. 394 U.S. 244 (1969).
24. Knecht, Participant Eavesdropping And The Right of Privacy: Time To Strike
.4 New Balance, 8 CALuF. WEsTmN L. REv. 283 (1972).
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speaker's veracity, to name a few of the scientific advances which are
continually being made. A speaker should not be held to have waived
his constitutional protection from the confiscation of such personal in-
formation merely because he has assumed the risk that his conversation
might be repeated. One's misplaced confidence in another creates
only the risk that the conversation, not other personal information, will
be disclosed.
Even disregarding these technical elements of speech, the adop-
tion of the "assumption of risk" doctrine ignores a fundamental assump-
tion that we make every day, and that is that when we speak to another
in private we are heard by his ears alone and not by electronic devices.
In Katz, Justice Stewart speaking for the majority of the Court,
explained the assumption as follows:
One who occupies it [the telephone booth], shuts the door be-
behind him, and pays the toll that permits him to place a call
is surely entitled to assume -that the words he utters into the
mouthpiece will not be broadcast to the world.25
Here the other party to the conversation had not consented to the sur-
veillance, and it is just this exception to -the Katz rule that the Court
espoused in White.
If the law gives no protection to the wrongdoer whose trusted
accomplice is or becomes a police agent, neither should it
protect him when -that same agent has recorded or transmit-
ted the conversations which are later offered in evidence to
prove the State's case.26
The Court went on to say, "Our problem, in terms of the principles
announced in Katz, is what expectations of privacy are constitutionally
'justifiable'-what expectations the Fourth Amendment will protect in
the absence of a warrant. '27 According to the Court, it is not consti-
tutionally justifiable to expect that the person to whom one is talking
will not divulge the conversation by recording or transmitting it to police
officers.
Upon further analysis it will be seen that this argument cannot
hold up under the Katz rule which protects people and not places. It
is not the method of eavesdropping but rather the eavesdropping itself
from which a person is protected.
25. 389 U.S. at 352.
26. 401 U.S. at 752. For an analysis of White see Saunders, Electronic Eavesdrop-
ping And The Right To Privacy, 52 BOSTON U.L. REv. 831 (1972).
27. 401 U.S. at 752.
[Vol. 10:386
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Suppose the facts in Katz are changed so that the party to the con-
versation with the defendant consented to the bug on the telephone
booth. Have the defendant's constitutional rights against electronic
eavesdropping been waived or does the fact that a party to the conver-
sation gave consent make the defendant's expectations constitutionally
unjustifiable? The Court in White would probably take the latter view,
for so far as the invasion of privacy is concerned, it should make no
difference whether the police bug the phone booth, tap the telephone
line, or listen in on an undercover agent's transmission. In the Court's
view, so long as one party consents to the eavesdropping there has been
no constitutional violation.
Under the modified facts of Katz, the officers are able to make
the same invasion into the defendant's privacy that was forbidden when
no consent existed. In other words the constitutionality of the eaves-
dropping seems to turn on whether consent has been given. When
stated in this fashion, the analysis demands that we label the loss of
constitutional protection as a waiver instead of concluding that consent
vitiates any basis of a constitutional fight. Allowing the waiver of con-
stitutional fights in this manner by unauthorized third parties flies in
the face of current notions of individual constitutional protection.28
Katz should be read to protect the speaker not so much from what a
party to the conversation may do on his own but rather what police offi-
cers may do through him or by his consent.
Even putting aside the argument relating to waiver, the conclusion
that consent by a third party vitiates any claim of constitutional protec-
tion can only be reached by focusing entirely on the actions of the other
party to the conversation rather than on the actions of the police force.
If the defendant in Katz had an expectation of privacy, the fact that
the person to whom he was speaking might have consented to the
eavesdropping does not change his expectations. The actions by the
police officers in Katz and in the "modified Katz" case are identical,
i.e., bugging the phone booth. Similarly, the actions by the police offi-
cers in White involved eavesdropping. To allow the decision to turn
on a third party's consent is to rely on a concept of waiver, and labeling
it something else only circumvents the real issue: constitutional protec-
tion from electronic surveillance without a warrant.
28. Annot., 31 A.L.R.2d 1078 (1953). Even if by some twisting of logic it could
be said that each party has a joint interest in the conversation, it has been held that
a police officer may not rely on the consent of a joint owner to a search where the
other joint owner is present and objects to the search. See Tompkins v. Superior Court,
27 Cal. Rptr. 889, 378 P.2d 113 (1963).
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The Constitution of course was designed to protect everyone, in-
cluding the guilty. However, with "hindsight" analysis it is easy to
rationalize that a criminal who is planning a crime should be held to
assume the risk that his conversations might be recorded. As the Court
in White put it:
Inescapably, one contemplating illegal activites must
realize and risk that his companions may be reporting to the
police. . . . In terms of what his course will be, what he will
or will not do or say, we are unpersuaded that he would dis-
tinguish between probable informers on the one hand and
probable informers with transmitters on the other.20
At first glance this explanation may seem justified, but the rationale
is based on the assumption that the speaker is in fact guilty of some
crime. If this assumption can be validly made, then there is no need
for any surveillance at all. When we assume that a person is innocent,
as we must, the argument crumbles. Indeed, -the innocent as well as
the guilty have every right to rely on the private nature of their con-
versations. If there is probable cause to believe a person is guilty of
a crime or that he is planning a crime and that evidence of such crime
may be available by intercepting certain conversations, then there
should be little trouble in obtaining a warrant to conduct electronic sur-
veillance as provided by the Crime Control Act. In this way the surveil-
lance would be sanctioned by a magistrate based on probable cause
rather than by a police officer based on some assumption of guilt. We
would not for a moment allow a search of a person's home based on
a police officer's assumption that the owner is guilty of possessing
contraband; neither should we allow electronic surveillance based oa
a rationale which requires an assumption of guilt.
IV. CONCLUSION
By allowing electronic surveillance upon the consent of one of the
parties to the conversation, the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act makes it possible for several highly private elements of
speech to be "seized" by law enforcement officers. Electronic eaves-
dropping, which involves the manifestaton of a person's thoughts and
ideas as well as the technical elements of speech, not only violates
fourth amendment protection against unlawful searches and seizures
but also strikes at the very heart of our democratic system which
29. 401 U.S. at 752.
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promises and relies on the concept of unmolested free thought and free
communication.
By using the argument of "assumption of risk," the courts have
seemingly overlooked the difference between recording or broadcasting
a conversation and merely repeating it verbally. In addition, the use
of the argument to find that no justifiable expectation of privacy exists
once consent is given by a party to the conversation is invalid. Such
an argument allows the existence of a constitutional right to stand or
fall on consent of a third party.
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